D-Days for Rafale

Quite apart from being the subject of real interest from potential export customers, Dassault’s Rafale fighter bomber is making great progress in French air force (Armée de l’Air) and navy (Aéronavale) service.
When France left a collaborative European fighter programme to develop the Rafale, it did so because it wanted a smaller, lighter, cheaper aircraft than its former partners, more optimized to the air-to-ground role, and better sized for carrier operations and for export. As a result, today’s Rafale is a smaller, lighter aircraft than the rival Eurofighter Typhoon, somewhat cheaper, and with greater emphasis having been placed on getting fighter-bomber capabilities into service early. As a direct result of this approach, the Rafale enjoys considerably greater maturity in the vital air-to-ground role than its closest rivals – the multi-national Typhoon and Sweden’s Gripen, whose air-to-surface capabilities still remain relatively modest.
The Rafale ‘entered service’ with the Aéronavale on December 4 2000 and became operational in 2004. The first Armée de l’Air Rafale squadron formed in the summer of 2006. The type has now made a succession of deployments to support operations in Afghanistan, with the Navy using the type on board a carrier for extended evaluation from 2002. This saw it flying limited escort and tanker missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom during 2003.
The first fully operational Rafale deployment was undertaken by three two-seat Armée de l’Air Rafale B aircraft, which were based at Dushanbe in Tajikistan from March until mid-2007, flying missions over Afghanistan. An Aéronavale Rafale M deployment was undertaken aboard the carrier Charles de Gaulle at the same time.
Since then there have been two deployments by single-seat Armée de l’Air Rafale Cs to Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan itself. The Rafale still has no autonomous self-designation capability and relies on laser designators on the ground, or carried by accompanying Mirage 2000s. The primary weapon used in Afghanistan has been the 500lb GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb, four of which are usually carried with a pair of under-wing fuel tanks.
The first air force Rafale C deployment to Kandahar saw the initial operational firing of the new Armement air-sol modulare (AASM) bomb, an INS/GPS guided rocket-boosted missile. On April 19 2008, a Rafale operating from Kandahar fired two 250kg weapons at a Taliban bunker from a 10km stand-off range. A Canadian FAC on the ground transmitted the GPS coordinates of the target directly to the aircraft.
Back in Metropolitan France, March 2009 saw the inauguration of the Armée de l’Air’s second Rafale squadron, EC 1/91 ‘Gascogne’, which joined EC 1/7 ‘Provence’ at St Dizier. The squadron will eventually operate in the nuclear strike role, using the ASMP-A missile, and will become operational next summer.
With the French Defence Ministry eager to slow down deliveries of its own Dassault Rafales, in order to spread its spending on the aircraft over a longer period, the need to find export customers for this impressive and capable swing role fighter-bomber has become more and more pressing for the manufacturer. Rafale production has already been reduced from 14 aircraft annually to just 11 and, though French requirements remain at 294 aircraft (234 for the Armée de l’Air and 60 for the Aéronavale), only 120 have actually been ordered, and 82 of these will have been delivered by the end of the year. A further 60 aircraft order is expected, but unless it is placed soon, there could be a production gap.
Dassault hopes to win export orders to gain vital revenue, to maintain the most economically efficient production rate – which some analysts estimate at 18 aircraft per annum – and also to fund planned improvements to the aircraft.
After the disappointment of being rejected in South Korea, Norway, the Netherlands and Singapore, Rafale’s export prospects now look very much brighter. The aircraft still looks well-placed to win an order in Brazil, though there was some frantic back-tracking after a comment in September by president Luiz da Silva that Brazil would “enter final negotiations” to buy at least 36 Rafale F3 fighters. The Brazilian Defence Minister, Nelson Jobim, immediately issued a statement saying the air force would continue negotiating terms for the FX-2 contract with all three competitors, effectively denying that Rafale had already won, which had been the original impression.
The aircraft also remains in strong contention in Switzerland and India (where reports in April 2009 that the Rafale had been disqualified from the competition for not meeting minimum performance requirements were explicitly denied by the Indian MoD), and in Greece.
In the Middle East, an order from the UAE seems to be becoming increasingly likely. French president Nicholas Sarkozy claimed that the UAE government was in discussions to buy the aircraft in June 2008. This June, Abu Dhabi’s state news agency confirmed that: “The Government of France has received the technical and operational specifications required in the French Rafale jet fighter from the UAE Armed Forces in the framework of the ongoing negotiations between the governments of the UAE and France.” Though no formal announcement is expected imminently, talks are understood to have reached an advanced stage, even including discussions as to the possible buy-back or onward sale of the UAE’s existing Dassault Mirage 2000-9s, according to Dassault chief executive Charles Edelstenne. Military co-operation between France and the UAE has also intensified, and Armée de l’Air Rafales have already undertaken exercises in the UAE, operating from Base Aerienne 104 – the newly-opened permanent French military enclave at Al Dhafra air base.
The UAE is being assiduously courted by Dassault and the French government. UAE VIPs attended the first public air display by an Armée de l’Air Rafale earlier this summer and a model of Rafale was prominently displayed at the Paris Air Show carrying unique-to-the-UAE weapons configurations, including the Al Hakim rocket-powered precision stand-off bomb.
One problem facing Dassault is that the UAE requires capabilities that have long been planned for Rafale, but which are not yet available on Armée de l’Air aircraft, thanks to development delays and funding constraints.
The UAE wants an operational active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, a helmet-mounted sight and display system, an advanced forward sector infrared search and track system, a laser designation/targeting pod, an advanced defensive aids system (DAS), and a full spectrum of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, including the MBDA Meteor beyond-visual-range air-air missile, and Scalp and Al Hakim ASMs.
Most of these improvements and enhancements are planned for French Rafales and work is already under way on the AESA version of the RBE2 radar, and on integrating the Damocles targeting pod. But integration of the Gerfaut helmet sight and enhanced OSF remain unfunded, and Rafale’s Systeme de Protection et d’Evitement des Conduites de Tir du RAfale (SPECTRA) DAS remains some way short of its originally planned capabilities.
Integration of Meteor on the Rafale is currently scheduled to begin in 2013-14 for service entry in 2017-18, and though it has been suggested that this date could be brought forward if necessary, this could be too late for the UAE.
But the key ‘missing feature’ for the UAE is a more powerful engine. The UAE’s requirement emphasizes long-range interdiction, and the air force is interested in operating the aircraft in some heavy configurations. The Rafale has been criticized in some quarters for being under-powered, and the existing 75 kN SNECMA M88-2 engine may not be ideally suited for such configurations in the hot-and-high conditions that may be experienced in the Middle East.
The focus of engine development for the French military has been on improving costs of ownership and extending the time between overhauls under the M88-TCO programme, with blisks, single crystal turbine blades, ceramic coatings and a range of other advanced technologies. There is also an M88-X project, which does aim to increase thrust to about 88-kN, aimed at export customers. A test programme for this new powerplant, with a new high-pressure core, is already under way. SNECMA says that a production M88-X could be available within three years of a contract being signed.
But while an increased thrust engine is possible, the French government has made it clear that it has no requirement for such a higher-thrust powerplant and, therefore, will not fund the development programme, which has been estimated to cost €250-€300 million. This would mean that the UAE (and/or Brazil and/or India) would need to fund development of the new engine. This could be enough to scupper the deal, and it could make an alternative aircraft a better option, off-the-shelf, for the UAE.
The UAE might also be a customer for conformal fuel tanks – already flown in mock-up form – since these would allow extended range without using external stores stations to carry drop tanks.
A first delivery of the Rafale to the UAE would not be made before 2012, according to Edelstenne, and he estimated that the UAE Air Force would probably need about three years to train pilots to operate its new aircraft.
The UAE’s interest in Rafale follows failed campaigns in Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Libya. In 2005 French newspapers reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to acquire up to 96 Rafales for a reported price of some €6bn following discussions between then-French president Jacques Chirac and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah, though Saudi Arabia subsequently confirmed its order for 72 Eurofighter Typhoons, and Dassault subsequently denied that there had been any offer or negotiations.
In June 2006, French press agencies reported that Morocco was expected to become the first export customer for the Dassault Rafale, with Saudi Arabia funding a €2.3bn ($3.22bn) 12-18 aircraft package for the Kingdom. After initial optimism, it was acknowledged that the Rafale was ‘out of the race’ in late 2007, amid reports of poor co-ordination and contradictory pricing from the DGA and Dassault, with the French State Arms Agency trying to tie the Rafale deal to frigate and helicopter orders. Though it was reported that Morocco came “within an inch” of signing for Rafale, the Kingdom eventually bought 36 F-16s instead, at a reported price of $2.3bn.
The next opportunity in the Middle East reportedly came in December 2007, when Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s head of state, visited Paris. The French newspaper Le Figaro jumped the gun and reported that Libya had actually agreed to purchase 14 Rafales, but soon withdrew the story. Other papers reported that Gaddafi had merely signed an agreement to start negotiations for a €2.5bn ($3.24bn) deal for 13-18 F3 standard Rafales.
This was a bilateral government-to-government negotiation and a Dassault spokesman denied that the company was in any negotiations with the Libyan government.
In March 2008 it was announced that commercial and technical negotiations had been “largely completed”, but then it all went quiet. More recently, and perhaps coincidentally, on August 28 this year, three single-seat Armée de l’Air Rafales from St Dizier flew to Tripoli to participate in an air show commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the First of September Great Revolution of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – the coup in which Gaddafi seized power. The visit was described as demonstrating France’s wish to reinforce its defence co-operation with Libya, but may also have been a barely concealed sales demonstration.
Dassault also claims interest in the Rafale from Qatar, Kuwait, and even Oman. Qatar, already an operator of the Mirage 2000, is probably the best prospect among these three Arab nations. The Rafale was reportedly offered to Qatar during high-level talks between Sheikh Hamad and French president Sarkozy, though the Lockheed Martin F-16 and Eurofighter Typhoon also remain in contention.
In February 2009, Sarkozy announced that Kuwait was close to buying 14-28 Rafales to replace its Boeing F/A-18 Hornets – for delivery before the end of the year. Though Kuwait has operated French equipment in the past (including Mirage F1 fighters), and though Kuwaiti defence minister Sheikh Jaber al-Hamad al-Sabah suggested that Rafale was worth “serious consideration”, due to its “high quality and advanced technology” nothing further has been heard, and Kuwaiti interest is believed to have turned elsewhere.
During the same visit to the region, Sarkozy also offered Rafales to Oman to replace its ageing fleet of SEPECAT Jaguars. This was an optimistic pitch, as Oman has for many years aligned its air arm with the Royal Air Force, and was already known to be working on a plan to buy Eurofighter Typhoons to meet the Jaguar replacement requirement.
Though Dassault have so far failed to find an export customer for the Rafale, all of that could change within the next few months, with decisions looming in Brazil, Switzerland and India. We could still see the type repeating the formidable export success of the company’s Mirage fighter family. If so, the Middle East may lie at the heart of that success, by providing the injection of investment that will be required to allow Dassault to complete its ambitious plans to upgrade and modernize the aircraft, finally allowing it to fulfil its very considerable potential.
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